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Abstract 
  
Rising use of public-private partnerships, or PPPs, is an important 
development in U.S. infrastructure delivery. PPPs are detailed contracts 
between a public-sector infrastructure project sponsor and a private-sector 
provider that bundle delivery services. PPPs represent a middle ground 
between pure-public project delivery and complete privatization. As of 2016, 
thirty-five U.S. states had enacted PPP enabling laws. That legislation 
defines the broad institutional framework surrounding a PPP agreement. It 
addresses such questions as the mixing of public- and private-sector funds, 
the treatment of unsolicited PPP proposals, and need for prior legislative 
approval of PPP contracts, among other key issues. We provide the first 
thorough empirical assessment of the impact of PPP enabling laws on a 
state’s utilization of private investment. We analyze the overall effect of 
having a PPP enabling law while controlling for a variety of factors, including 
the state’s indebtedness, its broad political disposition, union membership, 
per-capita income, and other variables. We then assess the impact of 
thirteen individual PPP enabling-law provisions. We develop an expert-
informed weighted index reflecting the degree to which a state’s law is 
encouraging or discouraging of private investment. We find that more 
favorable PPP enabling laws increase private investment: when our 
favorability index increases by one-tenth, the proportion of infrastructure 
investment delivered via PPP in a state increases by 0.5-0.6. We find that 
PPP enabling-law provisions allowing unsolicited proposals and the 
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There is a robust global discussion decrying the lack of infrastructure investment across 
numerous economic sectors (Woetzel et al 2016). By one estimate, the global infrastructure gap 
– the difference between current investment rates and investment needs – is $350 billion 
annually (ibid). Public-private partnerships, or PPPs, are sometimes offered as a solution to 
bridging the infrastructure gap.1  
Although PPPs do not generate additional funding for infrastructure (which must come from 
either users fees or broader tax revenue) per se, when properly structured they can improve on-
time and on-cost project delivery, enhance innovation in project delivery, better allocate risks, 
and improve project performance.2 In the United States, the PPP approach stands in contrast to 
what is often called “traditional delivery.” Traditional project delivery refers to the use of design-
bid-build (DBB) contracts, under which project design is placed out for bid. The construction of 
that design is bid out separately, usually to the lowest bidder. The public sector finances the 
project using tax-exempt municipal bonds. It also operates and maintains the project over its life 
span. That is, traditional U.S. infrastructure delivery is unbundled in the sense that the main tasks 
are conducted separately. Under a PPP approach, tasks such as facility design, construction, 
financing, operation and maintenance, can be bundled together in various combinations 
depending on the project to be delivered.3 This facilitates exploitation of synergies between those 
functions (Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008).  
 Appropriate PPP laws use are widely viewed as important prerequisites for the political 
and regulatory stability necessary to attract private participation in infrastructure (World 
Economic Forum, 2015, p. 11). Commentators stress that this is particularly important for the 
United States (Fishman, 2009), while others suggest that PPPs in the United States are hindered 
                                               
1 According to the U.S. Federal Highway Administration, “Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are 
contractual agreements formed between a public agency and private sector entity that allow for greater 
private sector participation in the delivery and financing of transportation projects.” See U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, P3 Defined, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/defined/index.htm (accessed May 21, 2015).  
2 For summaries of the benefits of the PPPs, see e.g. Geddes (2011) and the National Surface 
Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission (2009). 
3 See U.S. Department of Transportation (2007, pp. 11-17) for a discussion of PPP contract types. 
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by a lack of adequate state-level enabling legislation (e.g. Reinhardt, 2011).4 Indeed, many 
legislatures state that their purpose in enacting such laws is to attract private infrastructure 
investment.  
PPP enabling laws clarify such issues as treatment of unsolicited PPP proposals, whether 
a PPP can be used on existing (referred to as “brownfield”) as well as new (referred to as 
“greenfield”) transportation facilities, whether agreements can include the sharing of revenue 
with public sponsors, and whether the agreement may include non-compete clauses, among other 
questions.5 From a potential private partner’s perspective, it is risky to expend time, money, and 
effort developing infrastructure projects that may ultimately fail to receive the necessary 
authorization. Enabling legislation provides a framework for contracting that helps reduce such 
uncertainty while clarifying risk allocation between the public sponsor and the private partner 
(Iseki et al, 2009). Properly structured PPP enabling laws can thus reduce the transaction costs 
associated with private infrastructure investment.  
Despite their rising popularity, there has been little empirical examination of PPP 
enabling laws’ effects. We are the first to empirically explore the impact of state-level PPP 
enabling laws and their provisions on private investment in infrastructure. After controlling for 
numerous exogenous factors, we find that PPP enabling laws facilitate private investment in 
infrastructure. Although rising, private investment in U.S. transportation infrastructure remains 
low by international standards, and controversy surrounding the use of PPPs to finance and 
operate transportation infrastructure remains.6  
We assess the effect of simply having a law as well as the impact of varying degrees of 
legal favorability to private investment.  To do so, we develop an enabling law favorability index 
by considering thirteen key provisions of each law. Rather than weighting each provision 
                                               
4 Istrate and Puentes (2011) stress PPP enabling laws as one of their three key recommendations for 
attracting private investment into U.S. infrastructure. 
5 A list of key provisions is provided in Table 1 below. 
6 Regarding low U.S. use of private investment in infrastructure, see Istrate and Puentes (2011, p. 4, 
Figure 1). Critics argue that PPPs do not create net social value, merely hide debt from the government’s 
balance sheet, raise the social cost of capital, and help protect the interests of private parties who are 
likely to exploit market power and superior bargaining skills relative to the public sector (e.g. Quiggin 
2004, Dannin 2011, Roin 2011). Others argue that PPPs generate net social value through improved 
incentives to innovate, additional sources of capital, greater contractual transparency, and clearer linking 
of project returns to performance (e.g. Gilroy 2009, Poole 1993, National Surface Transportation 
Infrastructure Financing Commission 2009). Our analysis instead focuses on PPP enabling laws’ impact 




equally, however, we surveyed U.S. PPP experts to assign meaningful weights to various 
provisions.  
We analyze data on 177 U.S. transportation PPP projects completed between 1998 and 
2016 using information gleaned from the Public Works Financing monthly newsletter. Public 
Works Financing reports information on all North American PPP projects, allowing a 
comprehensive analysis of PPP enabling laws’ effect on private investment. We consider the 
1988 to 2016 period to examine how varying exposure to PPP enabling laws across time – and to 
their differing elements – impacts the cumulative number of PPPs as well as overall PPP 
investment. We focus on the proportion of PPP investment relative to total investment in a state’s 
roads and highways in a cross-sectional setting. We describe our data set and empirical methods 
in detail below.  
We find that PPP enabling laws increase the number of PPPs undertaken in a state and 
that more favorable laws result in more PPP contracts. We find a similar effect on PPP 
investment per capita and on the proportion of PPP investment relative to total investment in 
roads and highways.  
We proceed as follows. We next discuss the basic structure of PPP enabling laws in the 
U.S. transportation sector. We describe the dataset, variables and our main predictions regarding 
the role of PPP enabling laws in facilitating PPP contracts and private investment in Section 3. 
Section 4 discusses empirical methods used, reports estimates, and offers a discussion. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Public-Private Partnerships in Transportation  
Private participation via PPP may include the management, operation, and renovation of an 
existing transportation facility, as well as the design, construction, financing and operation of a 
new facility. For both brownfield PPPs, and those greenfield PPPs that include an operational 
component, the public project sponsor contractually specifies how the facility is to be renovated, 
maintained and, if necessary, expanded. The contract also specifies the determination of tolls and 
concession length. Key performance indicators (or KPIs) are typically included, such as safety 
standards and pavement quality, with clear financial and operational performance incentives. 
According to Public Works Financing, PPPs have been used to help finance and build at least 
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177 transportation projects for a total of $115 billion between 1988 and 2016 in the United 
States.  
Although investment in transportation infrastructure through PPPs accounts for about 11 
percent of all national capital investment in new highway capacity in 2011, its use increased 
significantly in recent years. Between 2001 and 2010, five states on average started a new 
transportation PPP each year (Reinhardt 2011). Until 2010, PPP projects accounted for a yearly 
average of about $2.4 billion (in constant 2010 dollar terms), while the amount significantly 
increased between 2011 and 2016, reaching a yearly average of $7.5 billion. 
The failed attempt to lease the Pennsylvania Turnpike illustrates enabling laws’ role in 
attracting investment. In May 2008, Pennsylvania’s government announced that a partnership of 
Citi Infrastructure Investors and the Spanish firm Abertis Infraestructuras was the chosen 
concessionaire for a 75-year lease of the Pennsylvania Turnpike with a winning bid (i.e. lease 
payment) of $12.8 billion. The state’s legislature, however, allowed the bid to expire by failing 
to pass the requisite enabling legislation. The process of generating bids for which there was 
ultimately no return – even for the winning bidder – was costly.7 Costs include holding in place 
commitments on $12.8 billion in financing as well as direct contracting costs. PPP enabling laws 
thus help reduce the risk of political uncertainty by granting ex ante legislative approval. Ex post 
legislative approval of individual PPP agreements concluded by other units in a state, which can 
be proscribed by a PPP law, is a major disincentive to private-sector investment (Rall, Reed, & 
Farber, 2010).8  
There is anecdotal evidence that PPP laws encourage investment. Commentators stress 
that states with the most advanced PPP legislation receive the greatest private-sector attention 
(Gilroy, 2009). Moreover, sixty percent of all PPP projects between 1989 and 2012 occurred in 
                                               
7 Commentators view such unrecovered bidding costs as a major deterrent to private participation. John 
Durbin, former executive director of the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, noted that “[t]here will not 
be another consortium that will proceed in any state where they have to put their bids in first and then 
gain legislative approval to lease the asset” (Pew Center on the States 2009, p.18). The lack of enabling 
legislation was dispositive for the investors in this case. Samuel (2008) states that, “The Abertis-Citi 
current offer of $12.8 billion for a 75 year lease/concession of the Pennsylvania Turnpike expires next 
Tuesday Sept 30, and signs are it won't be extended. Last week a senior officer of the two companies was 
saying that without movement on enabling legislation this month, they were done. ” See Geddes and 
Wagner (2013) for further discussion of the importance of PPP enabling laws. 
8 Several states nevertheless have provisions in their enabling legislation requiring legislative approval. 
Addressing the disincentive to invest created by legislative approval requirements, one commentator 
claims that, “[i]n those states whose PPP enabling acts required legislative approval of negotiated deals no 
such deals were ever proposed.” Poole (2009). 
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only six large states. All of those states have PPP enabling legislation.9 We expect that both 
passing a law and enacting a more favorable law will increase PPP investment over time.  
We utilized the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) website and other key sources 
to determine which states have enacted PPP enabling laws.10 All information was verified 
through examination of state PPP statutes and traced back to its passage using LexisNexis. 
Figure 1 displays the evolution of U.S. PPP enabling laws. Since passage of the first modern PPP 
law in 1988, the number of states with laws steadily increased over time until 2000.11 From 2000 
to 2005, the number of states with laws remained constant. Law adoption restarted in 2006 with 
the passing of an enabling law in Indiana, followed by several other states. By December 2012 
thirty-four states (plus Puerto Rico) had legislation giving explicit authority to an agent of the 
state (such as the state’s department of transportation), to enter into a PPP agreement. After 2012 
the enactment of laws slowed; only Kentucky was added to the list. Figures 2 and 3 show total 
annual and cumulative PPP investment from 1988 to 2016, respectively. 
FIGURE 1.  Number of U.S. States with a PPP Enabling Law (1988-2016) 
 
                                               
9 Those states are Florida, California, Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Colorado. 
10 Federal Highway Administration, State P3 Legislation, (available at: 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/state_legislation/index.htm, accessed May 21, 2015).  Additional sources 
include Pikiel & Plata (2008); Iseki et al (2009); and Rall, Reed & Farber (2010). 
11 Modern PPP legislation began with Virginia’s Highway Corporation Act, which was passed in 1988. 
New Jersey had an enabling law passed by mid 1990s, but it ceased to be in effect as of 2003. The District 

























































































































































































































3. PPP enabling laws and the favorability index.   
We next describe our data. Our dataset includes an indicator for the year in which a state first 
passed a PPP enabling law, and the provisions included. Our time frame begins with the passage 
of the first modern PPP law, Virginia’s Highway Corporation Act of 1988, and ends in 2016, 
which is the last year for which we have complete independent-variable data. Our data are thus a 
state-by-year panel from 1988 to 2016 forming a sample of 1,450 observations. In addition to 
evaluating the effect of having an enabling law (or not) on PPP investment, we address a second 
empirical question: how important are particular PPP law provisions in attracting private 
investment?12  
We first examined the broader literature on state legislation to assess which provisions 
are generally viewed as important.13 Poole (1993) and Hedlund and Chase (2005) provided initial 
guidance.14 Using those and several additional sources, we identified thirteen enabling law 
provisions to form our basic PPP law favorability index. We then conducted a survey of PPP 
experts to assign weights to each provision. We asked respondents to rank each provision on a 
five-point Likert scale from “very discouraging” to “very encouraging” of private investment.15  
We then assigned each rank an integer value as follows: 
-2 = Very discouraging of private investment 
-1 = Somewhat discouraging of private investment 
 0 = No effect on private investment 
 1 = Somewhat encouraging of private investment 
 2 = Very encouraging of private investment  
We calculated the mean value for each provision and divided it by two to produce a favorability 
score for each provision between -1 and 1. Table 1 reports the resulting “survey-weighted 
                                               
12 Understanding these effects is of more than academic interests. It may also provide guidance to the 
remaining states about the most desirable PPP enabling law structure. 
13 This includes the so-called “secondary literature,” which is composed of government reports, working 
papers, white papers, expert commentary, etc.  
14 See Geddes and Wagner (2013) for a discussion of the development of our PPP enabling law index. 
Additional sources include Fishman (2009); Iseki et al (2009); and Rall, Reed, & Farber (2010).  
15 Fifteen experts answered the survey. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the distribution of experts across 
ten major organizational types, such as federal and state government, think tanks and academia. Experts 
are well-distributed across organizational types, with the exception of law firms and toll road operators. 
We thus do not view our survey weightings as systematically biased. 
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enabling score” for each provision relevant to our empirical analysis. A higher score indicates a 
more encouraging provision.  
 







The law allows both public and private sector money to be combined in 
the financing of a PPP project. 
0.90 
Eligibility Road and highways are not eligible for PPPs under the statute -0.84  
Avail The law explicitly permits the state to make payments to the private 





The law does not put a limit on the number of projects that can be 
developed under the PPP approach. 
0.79 
Confident The law protects the confidentiality of proprietary information 
contained in a private entity's proposal. 
0.79 
Priorleg The law does not include a provision that allows the state legislature 
(or another public body) to reject a PPP agreement. 
0.77 
Brown The law allows existing transportation facilities, as well as new 
transportation facilities, to be PPP-eligible. 
0.77 
Others The law explicitly grants authority to entities other than the state DOT 
(i.e. counties, municipalities) to enter into PPP agreements (assuming 
that the state DOT also has authority). 
0.67 
Exemptpro The statute exempts PPPs from the state's procurement laws. 0.61 
Revenue The law permits revenue sharing in PPP agreements. 0.60 
Noncomp The law allows PPP agreements to contain non-compete clauses or 
compensation clauses. 
0.57 
Unsolic The law allows the responsible public entity to receive both solicited 
and unsolicited PPP proposals. 
0.54 
Proptax The law exempts the private entity from paying property taxes on the 
land required to operate the facility. 
0.47 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
 We next catalogued the provisions contained in each state’s enabling law. We then 
divided the total by 13 (the total number of possible provisions in any given law) to generate an 
overall favorability index for each state’s law.16 Some states replaced older PPP laws with newer 
ones during our study period. We used LexisNexis to track changes in those laws since their 
inception, which we incorporate into the favorability index. This provides a time-varying 
favorability score for each state that varies between zero and ten. States without laws received 
favorability index scores of zero. Scores for each state are reported in Table 2. 
 
 
                                               





TABLE 2 - Dates of First Passage of U.S. PPP Laws and Favorability Scores 
State Year PPP Index   State Year PPP Index 
Alabama 1996 4.3   Montana - - 
Alaska 2006 1.7   Nebraska - - 
Arizona 1991 5.2   Nevada    2003 2.7 
Arkansas 2011 3.4   New Hampshire        - -  
California 1989 3.0   New Jersey 1997 ^ 
Colorado 1995 6.3   New Mexico - - 
Connecticut 2011 4.1   New York - - 
Delaware 1995 4.2   North Carolina 2000 3.4 
Florida 1991 4.7   North Dakota 1993 4.5 
Georgia 1998 6.3   Ohio 2011 5.4 
Hawaii - -   Oklahoma - - 
Idaho - -   Oregon 1995 6.1 
Illinois 2011 4.4   Pennsylvania 2012 4.7 
Indiana 2006 4.1   Rhode Island - - 
Iowa - -   South Carolina 1994 3.4 
Kansas - -   South Dakota - - 
Kentucky 2016 5.9   Tennessee 2007 1.1 
Louisiana 1997 5.7   Texas 1991 5.8 
Maine 2010 3.1   Utah 1997 5.2 
Maryland 1997 3.1   Vermont - - 
Massachusetts 2009 5.0   Virginia 1988 6.3 
Michigan 2010 5.1   Washington 1993 2.7 
Minnesota 1993 2.1   West Virginia 2008 5.0 
Mississippi 2007 4.6   Wisconsin 1997 3.4 
Missouri 2006 2.4   Wyoming - - 
Notes: Dash indicates that no law was ever passed.  ^: Enabling law in New Jersey expired in 2003. 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
 
Amendments have made extant enabling laws more favorable to PPPs over time. Figure 3 
indicates that the average value of our favorability index has increased significantly since 1988, 






FIGURE 3.  Annual Average Value of PPP Index (1988-2016) 
 
 
Our index is broadly consistent with commentator views regarding which states are receptive to 
private investment. For example, Texas, Virginia, Georgia, and Florida are often cited as 
examples of states with a favorable climate.17  
4. Empirical Strategies and Estimates 
We next empirically examine PPP enabling laws’ impact on private infrastructure investment. 
We utilized data on all PPP projects as reported annually in the “U.S. Transportation Projects 
Scorecard” in Public Works Financing to measure PPP investment. We evaluate the effect of 
enabling laws on the number of PPP projects completed and on the amount of PPP investment 
considered as a share of PPP investment relative to total road and highway investment in a state.  
 We next describe both dependent and independent variables. Our main dependent 
variable is the proportion of PPP expenditure relative to total expenditure on roads and highways 
in each State. It is important to consider a proportion because states with larger total spending 
(public and private) may receive more PPP investment, thus biasing estimates. To compute the 
percentage of PPP investments we use data reported in tables entitled, “Total State Investments 
                                               
17 Consistent with our hypothesis that PPP enabling laws in those states facilitate investment, Gilroy 
(2009, p. 14) notes “States like Texas, Virginia, Georgia, and Florida are generally regarded as offering 
the best models [of PPP legislation], as evidenced by the fact that they are reaping the most private sector 





































































in Roads and Highways” from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government 
Finances. In other models, we use the number of projects as the dependent variable to examine if 
PPP laws helped more PPP projects to reach financial close.  
 Two key independent variables are PPP Act and PPP Index. Each will display a positive 
coefficient if enabling laws increase the amount of investment and the number of PPP projects. A  
two-sample t-test for equal variances for both the proportion of PPP investments and the total 
amount of PPP projects by the presence or not of a PPP law (PPP Act) is reported in Table 3. As 
expected, there is a positive association between laws and PPPs. The average percentage of PPP 
investments and the average annual number of projects are both statistically different and larger 
for States with a PPP law.  
 
TABLE 3. Two-sample t-test with Equal Variances Using Presence of a PPP Law  
All States (1450 observations) 
 Percentage of PPP investments Annual mean Number of Projects 
Without PPP Laws (0) 0.0010 0.0203 
With PPP Laws (1) 0.0062 0.2814 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1) 
null H0= diff = 0 
t = -5.60*** 
pvalue =0.000 
T = -11.67***  
pvalue =0.000 
 
Only (Treated) States with PPP law enacted between 1988 and 2016 (1044 observations) 
 Percentage of PPP investments Annual mean Number of Projects 
Without PPP Laws (0) 0.0007 0.0187 
With PPP Laws (1) 0.0062 0.2814 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1) 
null H0= diff = 0 
t = -5.09*** 
pvalue =0.000 
t= -8.79***  
pvalue =0.000 
   
 The same test applied only to States that enacted a law at some point between 1988 and 
2016 confirm that treated States have larger proportion of PPP investment and more PPP projects 
after PPP law enactment.  
 Our choice of other time-varying regressors for a multivariate analysis was based on a 
review of both the privatization and contracting out literatures. Researchers argue that 
governments utilize private investment in response to constraints on traditional financing sources 
for public-service provision. Capital constraints, rather than a quest for efficiency, thus drive 
private-sector participation (e.g. Bel and Fageda, 2007). We consequently include proxies for a 
state’s general fiscal health and its access to traditional sources of infrastructure financing (which 
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we call “traditional finance”).18  Those are measured by the state’s debt outstanding per capita 
(Real_Debt_pc), gas tax receipts per capita (Real_Gastax_pc) and federal aid for highways per 
capita (Real_Fedaid_pc). All these monetary variables are in constant 2010 dollar terms. 
Measures of political disposition and pressure groups are typically introduced in PPP 
empirical analysis. However, Albalate, Bel and Geddes (2013, 2015) find that political ideology 
is not relevant. Our attempts to consider the percentage of democrats in the state legislature or 
the political party of the Governor produce similar results (i.e. lack of significance). They are not 
included in our final specification as predictors, but they are used to instrument our key variable 
PPP Act, as described below. Albalate, Bel and Geddes (2013) find that the relative wage 
differential between the private and public sectors is significant in PPP choice in the U.S. water 
industry. If unions (perhaps to protect salaries and jobs), oppose PPPs in favor of an approach 
more likely to involve union labor, then the union variable will negatively impact PPP 
utilization. Similarly, if privately operated roadways are more likely to employ electronic tolling, 
then toll-collector unions may oppose PPPs. We include the unionization rate as a control.  
Other basic controls include real per-capita income and the state’s population. It is 
difficult to predict ex ante the impact either variable will have on the percentage of PPP 
investment relative to total investment in roads and highways. Table 4 reports summary statistics 
for all variables. We next describe our empirical strategy and estimating equations.  
 
 
4.a) The effect of PPP enabling laws in encouraging PPP investments. 
We use two complementary empirical strategies to assess the impact of PPP enabling laws on 
private investment in U.S. infrastructure. We first exploit our data’s panel features to examine 
the effect of a law and its favorability on PPP investment as well as on the total amount of PPP 
projects. We also estimate how exposure to evolving legal frameworks impacts the cumulative 
number of PPPs and cumulative private investment. This allows us to evaluate the long-term 
effects of favorable laws and to assess the role of specific provisions that may, by themselves, 
have only a short-term impact on annual PPP investment.   
 Our key dependent variable is the proportion of private investment relative to overall 
investment in roads and highways. Because our dependent variable is a proportion, we generalize 
                                               
18 We were unable to locate adequate state-by-year data for our time period that measures the condition of 
transportation infrastructure. Available measures were highly incomplete. 
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the maximum likelihood optimization of the fractional-response model to obtain parameter 
estimates within our panel-data setting. This is possible by applying a population-averaged, 
panel-data model with a within-group correlation structure. We thus estimate:  
 
Percentageit = α + β1D
PPP_Act + β2Real_income_pcit + β3Fedaid_pcit + β4Debt_pcit + β5Popit + β6Unionmit + 
β7Yeart
 + ɛit                                    (1) 
 
Percentageit= α + β1D
PPP_Index + β2Real_income_pcit + β3Fedaid_pcit + β4Debt_pcit + β5Popit + β6Unionmit 
+ β7Yeart
  + ɛit                       (2) 
 
Each variable is defined below. The two equations differ only in the use of the binary PPP Act 
indicator (set to one if the state has a PPP act in effect in that year, zero otherwise) versus the 
continuous PPP Index variable to capture the impact of PPP enabling laws. The dependent 
variable, Percentage, is the percentage of PPP investments in roads and highways divided by 
total investment in roads and highways in state i in year t, while Year denotes common trend 
effects, and ɛ is an error term.19 Estimates are presented in Table 4 below.  
 
  
                                               
19 Year-specific fixed effects are not included because Fractional Response panel data models (xtgee) and 2SLS 
models (ivreg) do not allow them in STATA.  Instead we use a linear common trend variable (YEAR). They are 
included in count data models where we evaluate the amount of PPP projects.  
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TABLE 4. Summary Statistics  
Variables Description Source Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Percentage Percentage of PPP investments over 
Total State Investments (in roads and 
highways) 
See Sections 3 and 4. 0.0030 0.0174 0 0.3184 
Projects Number of yearly PPP projects reaching 
financial close  
See Sections 3 and 4. 0.1220 0.4344 0 5 
PPP Act Binary variable taking value 1 a PPP 
enabling law is present; 0 Otherwise. 
See Section 3 0.3896 0.4878 0 1 
PPP Index PPP favorability index presented 
describe in Section 3. 
See Section 3. 1.435 2.031 0 7 
Real Personal Income_pc State real income per capita (Constant 
$2010) 
U.S. Census Bureau  36,780 6,970 21,649.5 63,017.8 
Real_Federalaid_pc Federal aid to highways per capita to the 
state 
U.S. Census Bureau 147.23 93.67 13.16 677.91 
Real_Gastax_pc State gasoline tax receipts per capita 
(Constant $2010) 
FHWA Highway Statistics 
Series 
147.759 41.30 0 276.60 
Real_Debt_pc State’s only Debt outstanding per capita 
(Constant $2010)  
U.S. Census Bureau 3,161 2,201 206.6 20,829.63 
Pop State population (000s) U.S. Census Bureau 5,708 6,303 454 39,250 
Unionm Percent of working population in a union 
in the state 
unionstats.com(from CPS) 12.35 5.92 2 31 
Year Variable that denotes the year of the 
observation.  




 Count data models are chosen to predict the yearly number of PPP projects that reach 
financial close. We apply two different models. We first use a standard Conditional Fixed-
Effects Negative binomial model which, unlike Poisson models, accounts for dispersion. We 
then apply a Zero-Inflated Negative-Binomial Model, which accounts for the large proportion of 
the zero values in our dependent variable (i.e. Projects). The estimating equations only differ 
with the addition of State-specific fixed effects (i.e. st).  
Our estimates displayed in Table 5 indicate that the PPP Act binary variable (model 1) 
and the favorability index of the state’s legislation (model 2) are statistically significant 
determinants of a state’s proportion of PPP investment. Both display a positive, statistically 
significant impact in the fractional-response model. This is consistent with predictions regarding 
the positive role of PPP legislation in attracting private investment. Regarding marginal effects, 
we find that the elasticity for the percentage of PPP investments is 0.52 with respect to PPP Act 
and 0.63 with respect to the PPP Index.20 Indeed, our estimates indicate that PPP laws are the 
main driver of PPP investment.  
 Our binary variables may potentially suffer from endogeneity, however.21 This could 
occur if PPP laws are passed in response to a previously agreed-upon PPP project, or if the state 
has recently signed a PPP contract that created public concern and engendered legislative action. 
We use a two-pronged approach to address this issue. We first report estimates using a two-stage 
procedure employing instrumental variables (2SLS). Second, because PPPs are often large and 
controversial events covered by the state’s media we report findings from an exhaustive 
investigation into news reports around the time of law adoption. State legislators adopting a PPP 
law in response to an impending transaction (perhaps due to pressure from investors) is 




                                               
20 Results are robust to different treatments of standard errors and different correlation structures. They 
are also robust to time-and-year fixed effects.  
21 Geddes and Wagner (2013) examine the drivers of a state’s decision to adopt a PPP enabling law. They 
find that states with higher levels of traffic congestion as measured by the travel-time index (TTI) are 
more likely to pass a PPP enabling law. We are aware of the possibility that the laws may be endogenous 
to the amount of investment. However, we were unable to detect an effect of completed private 
infrastructure investment on the travel-time index. 
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TABLE 5. Estimates of PPP Investment 
















PPP Index - 0.3622*** 
(0.0687) 
- 










































N. Observations 1450 1450 1450 
Wald-Chi2 49.47*** 1343.00*** 13.65* 
Notes: ***, **, * significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Errors are clustered allowing for arbitrary 
correlation by State in models (1) and (2). They are robust to heteroscedasticity in models (3) and (4).  
 
 Regarding 2SLS, we chose first-stage instruments to determine the adoption of a PPP 
enabling law. We use the annual number of laws enacted by State legislature in order to proxy 
the legislative intensity of the State, which is considered to be positively correlated with the 
probability of PPP enactment laws but uncorrelated with PPP investments. Other instruments 
included come from the statistically significant variables reported in Geddes and Wagner (2013), 
who estimate the determinants of PPP law passage. Instruments include the annual number of 
vehicle registrations and the travel-time index, as well as various political variables.  We include 
three political instruments to account for PPP enactment: the ideology of the constituency 
proxied by the percentage of votes for democratic candidates in the last presidential election, the 
percent of democrat representatives in the State legislature and a dummy variable indicating the 
political party of the Governor (zero democrat, one otherwise).  
 Estimates using this method are presented in model (3) of Table 5 for the percentage of 
PPP expenditures relative to total expenditures. The positive and statistically significant impacts 
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of PPP Act remain after correcting for possible endogeneity.22  2SLS models rely on the quality 
of instruments employed. On the one hand, the Hansen J-Test checks whether the restrictions 
implied by the existence of more instruments than endogenous regressors are valid (exogeneity 
requirement). Results of this test support our over-identifying restrictions strategy (Chi-sq= 4.30 
P-value =0.51). On the other, the Kleibergen-Paap test checks whether instruments are relevant 
(the relevance requirement), which is also satisfied (Chi-sq = 186.15*** P-val=0.0004).23 
 Our second strategy to address potential law endogeneity was to search for media 
reports of a law being passed in response to an impending agreement. That task would be 
onerous for all thirty-five states with PPP laws. We instead focus on five states that have 
exhibited high PPP activity: California, Florida, Texas, Virginia, and North Carolina. An 
exhaustive search into events surrounding PPP law passage in each state was conducted.24 It 
revealed lobbying by numerous stakeholders prior to the passage of an enabling law, including 
by state Departments of Transportation, Associated Builders and Contractors, and construction 
companies, among others. Regarding the laws’ importance for investors (i.e. our maintained 
hypothesis), there were several instances where private groups lobbied for a stronger PPP law 
lest they move investment to a more accommodating state. That is consistent with our 
hypothesis.25 In no case did our investigation reveal that a PPP agreement was concluded prior to 
the law’s passage, offering further comfort regarding possible law endogeneity.  
 We have thus far shown that PPP laws encourage a larger presence of PPP investments 
in the composition of total state and local road and highways expenditure. However, this could 
happen due to a substitution effect if State and Local road expenditure decreases. In order to 
evaluate if PPP expenditure is just substituting public sector expenditure rather than promoting 
additional investment, we perform an additional estimation using a panel-fixed-effect model to 
                                               
22 We do not replicate the analysis with the PPP index variable because of collinearity.  
23 The null hypothesis of this test is that the matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K1-1 (i.e. 
under-identified). The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F can also be used to check whether the equation is 
weakly identified. This is rejected at 5% in our model. 
24 We are grateful for Priya Mukherjee for thorough research assistance on this issue. Details of her 
investigation are available upon request. 
25 Using California’s PPP enabling law as an example, Skanska noted that, “The danger for California is 
that many of its neighbor states not only have legislation in place to allow for PPPs, but have established 
processes that make these efforts easier for all stakeholders. Should California lag behind these states, 
private money will go elsewhere.” 
(see “To enable its growing economy, California needs to renew its design-build and PPP legislation,” 
September 4, 2013, available at: http://blog.usa.skanska.com/to-enable-its-growing-economy-california-
needs-to-renew-its-design-build-and-ppp-legislation/ (accessed October 18, 2015). 
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estimate the impact of PPP laws on total per-capita state and local road expenditure – excluding 
PPPs- in constant terms (US$ of 2010). Rising expenditure on infrastructure via PPP in those 
states with laws did not crowd out government infrastructure spending. 
 Results for this test are summarized in Table 6. We report estimates of coefficients of 
the key PPP variables only, although the models presented in equations (4), (5) and (6) include 
the same regressors used in previous models displayed in Table 5.26 The coefficient associated 
with PPP act in the first column of Table 6 is not statistically significant. The same result is 
obtained when PPP index is used. Nonetheless, these variables capture the role of laws and their 
indirect effect on public-sector expenditure by attracting private investment. In order to test 
whether private expenditure substitutes for public-sector expenditure, we use the total amount of 
PPP expenditures directly. Estimates for this analysis are presented in the third column of Table 
6. Again, we find no statistical significance in its attached coefficient. Therefore, our estimates 
indicate that neither PPP legislation nor PPP expenditure in roads and highways negatively affect 
public-sector expenditure. Therefore we do not find evidence of a substitution effect.   
TABLE 6. Summary of Selected Least-squares Estimate Results for Total Public-Sector Investment  
Covariates Fixed Effects  




Fixed Effects  




Fixed Effects  
Total State and Local 
expenditures without PPP 
investments  
(6) 
PPP Act 14.42   
(19.29) 
- - 





- - -61.90  
(40.324) 
N. Observations 1.450 1.450 1.450 
R2 0.26 0.26 0.23 
F-test 5.97*** 5.79*** 5.48*** 
Notes: ***, **, * significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Errors are clustered allowing for arbitrary correlation by State.  
 Our results for count data models predicting the number of annual PPP projects are 
displayed in columns 7-10 of Table 7. Both fixed-effects negative binomial and zero-inflated 
negative binomial models consistently show that PPP laws and PPP Index are positively 
correlated with the number of projects reaching financial close.
                                               
26 We did this analysis for federal expenditure on roads and highways in per capita and constant terms. 
We find the same result that we find in the case of State and Local government expenditure.  
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TABLE 7. Estimates of the Amount of PPP Projects among Treated States





Negative Binomial  
PPP projects 
(8) 









































































N. Observations 841 1450 841 1450 
loglikelihood -313.55 -417.85 -315.14 -416.13 
Wald-Chi2 68.59*** - 72.47*** - 
LR Chi2 - 110.65*** - 113.62*** 
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4.b) The role of PPP law provisions on PPP outcomes. 
The above analysis suggests that PPP laws and their favorability index impact PPP investment. 
Specific provisions included in the legislation determined favorability. We now examine the role 
of PPP law provisions on the percentage of PPP investments relative to total roads and highways 
spending in the same 50 States between 1988 and 2016. We replicate our generalized linear 
model using fractional-response variables but now substitute our PPP law key variables (PPP 
Act and PPP Index) with specific binary variables that indicate whether a provision is included in 
the law or not. The 13 provisions considered are those presented and described in Table 1.  
Model (11) of Table 8 includes all observations, while regression (12) only considers data 
from States that enacted a PPP law between 1988 and 2016. Finally, regression (14) uses 
information only of States in years with PPP laws available. For this reason, the number of 
observation decreases with these models.  
Model (11) suggests mixed results regarding the role of provisions on the percentage of 
PPP investments in roads. Some provisions favor PPP investment, while others hamper their 
realization. On one hand, we find that allowing existing transportation facilities as well as new 
transportation facilities to be eligible for PPPs (Brown), exemptions from state’s procurement 
laws (Exemptpro) and from property taxes on the land required (Proptax), as well as the 
protection of confidentiality of proprietary information in the proposal (Confident), all do seem 
to favor PPP investments. On the other hand, PPP investments in roads are hampered by 
forbidding eligibility of roads and highways for PPPs (Elegibility), by allowing revenue sharing 
in agreements (Revenue) and by allowing both solicited and unsolicited PPP proposals (Unsolic). 
Unlike the opinion declared by experts to construct the favorability index, the latter two have a 
negative correlation instead of a positive correlation.  
We obtain similar results when we restrict our sample to States that enacted a law within 
our time frame (1988-2016), or when we consider observations of States in years with PPP laws 
only. There are however some remarkable differences. Allowing revenue sharing loses statistical 
significance in models (12) and (13) – avoiding the conflict with experts opinion - and allowing 
for both greenfield and brownfield projects loses statistical significance in model (13). The 
reduction of the sample also generates new statistically significant results. Allowing both public 
and private sector funds to be combined in the financing (i.e. Fundmix) gains statistical 
significance (at 10%) in model (13). The positive coefficient indicates that allowing for this 
21 
 
financing option increases PPP investments in States and years with a PPP law. We find the 
same result for laws not limiting the number of PPPs to pilot projects (i.e. Unlimitedpro), and the 
contrary for the provision that explicitly grants authority to entities other than the state DOT to 
enter into PPP agreements (i.e. Others).  
 
TABLE 8. Estimates of the Effect of State PPP Law Provisions on PPP Investment 
Provisions FR Model 
Percentage of PPP 




Percentage of PPP investments 
over Total  Investments 
(only treated States) 
(13) 
FR Model 
Percentage of PPP investments 
over Total  Investments 
















































































 Observations 1450 1044 567 
Wald-Chi2 283.38*** 291.52*** 660.21*** 
Notes: ***, **, * Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Errors clustered by State.  
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
Many U.S. states and localities are facing challenges in financing, maintaining, expanding and 
renovating their transportation infrastructure. There is high demand for transportation 
infrastructure, particularly in urban areas, but it is often poorly maintained and well past its 
original design life. One approach that is common globally and used increasingly in the United 
States is to increase private participation through PPPs. Thirty-five states plus Puerto Rico had 
modern PPP enabling laws in force as of late 2016. Those laws provide the institutional setting 
within which PPPs can be undertaken, thus lowering transaction costs. Enabling laws clarify 
important issues including whether or not PPPs can be used on both new and existing facilities, 
whether the state allows the mixing of public- and private-sector financing, whether or not the 
government can share toll revenue, and whether or not state legislative approval is needed after 
the PPP agreement is concluded.  
In addition to collecting and analyzing data on PPP enabling laws, we surveyed experts 
from a range of backgrounds to create an expert-weighted index of PPP enabling law 
favorability. We then assigned weights to thirteen critical elements of PPP enabling laws and 
studied state laws to determine which contain those various provisions. We then generated an 
index of enabling law favorability. More states passing PPP enabling laws while the average 
favorability of a U.S. PPP enabling law is rising over time. Our estimates indicate that better 
legal frameworks attract private capital to transport infrastructure projects. We find a strong, 
positive elasticity of 0.5 for the percentage of PPP investments in roads and highways with 
respect to PPP Act and of 0.6 to our PPP index variable. We also find a positive association 
between PPP laws and their favorability with the annual number of PPP projects reaching 
financial close. Moreover, the higher percentage of PPP investment relative to total state and 
local investment does not occur due to a crowding-out effect: PPP laws and PPP investments are 
not associated with lower levels of government investment in highways.   
Our estimates suggest several key conclusions regarding the proper structure of PPP 
enabling laws. Specific-provision estimates reveal that some provisions favor PPP investment in 
roads and highways while others hamper that investment. The most favorable and consistent 
results are associated with exemptions on from extant procurement laws and property taxes, and 
with confidentiality protection. The most problematic are those limiting PPPs to other sectors 
(excluding roads and highways) and those allowing for unsolicited proposals. Other provisions 
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show different results depending whether we include the whole sample, the sample of States with 
PPP laws, and the sample in years with existing PPP laws.  
Our findings are invariant to the method of measuring private infrastructure investment 
via PPPs, and are significant at standard levels of confidence. We believe that, in addition to 
extending the current literature, our analysis provides useful guidance to the remaining states and 
localities wishing to craft PPP enabling laws that effectively encourage additional private 
investment in infrastructure. It also offers guidance to those States wishing to revise their 
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